Contempt of House and the Fight for Supremacy- Conflict Between Legislature and Judiciary in India: Amrith. R & R. Gireeshvaran


Author: Amrith. R[1]

Co-Author: R. Gireeshvaran [2]

School of Excellence in Law, The Tamil Nadu Dr. Ambedkar Law University, Chennai

ISSN: 2582-3655


The following is a research paper that focuses on the conflict of contempt of house cases and the fight for supremacy by legislature and judiciary in India, with special reference to the case of Keshav Singh v. Speaker, Legislative Assembly, Uttar Pradesh [AIR 1965 All 349]. This case is considered to be a landmark case of high-water conflict between the judiciary and the legislature that has existed in India since the framing of the Constitution of India because of the ambiguity over Articles 194(3), which provides penal powers and special privileges and immunity to the legislators. The case revolves around whether Article 194(3) is more powerful than the fundamental rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitution and specifically Articles 19, 21, 22(1) and 22(2). The Supreme Court made use of the doctrine of harmonic construction to opine to the President of India’s Reference Order that Article 194(3) always yield to the fundamental rights and not vice versa. However, the Allahabad High Court asserted that since there was ambiguity over the law of special powers, privileges, and immunity of the legislature, held that it possessed penal powers and stated that fundamental rights always yield to Article 194(3) since the latter is a special proviso and the former are general provisos. The issue of punishing people for contempt has been a contentious one, thanks to the aforementioned article. The paper analyses Article 194(3) of the Indian Constitution and its evolution since the adoption of the Constitution.

Keshav Singh’s case and the pinnacle of the legislative-judiciary squabble in India


In the year 1964, the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly tried to find out the scope of its constitutional authority to penalize citizens for its contempt and denigration. This claim was made on the grounds that such power to interpret, elucidate and clarify the Constitution on the matter of privileges, was itself a privilege granted to the State Assemblies by the Indian Constitution under Article 194(3)[3]. The UP Assembly tried to enforce this claim by punishing two Judges of the Allahabad High Court and keeping them in custody because they had taken up the Habeas Corpus petition of a citizen, Keshav Singh, and had passed a temporary order of release of Keshav Singh on bail after he had been arrested on a warrant issued by the Speaker of the UP Assembly for contempt[4]. The petitioner’s complaint to the Allahabad High Court was that the Assembly had stepped beyond the limits of the powers conferred by the Constitution to punish for its contempt. The writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Keshav Singh sought the reference of various questions of profound constitutional importance by the President to the Supreme Court of India. The Allahabad High Court was able to pronounce the judgment of the case only after the Supreme Court answered the questions that were posed to it by the President.


Parliamentary privileges are those powers, privileges, and immunities which are enjoyed by the Parliament or a Legislative Assembly (House) collectively as well as by its committees and members. Without these privileges, it would be very difficult for legislators to discharge their duties properly[5]. It was under the Montague-Chelmsford reforms the freedom of speech and protection from subsequent actions during the proceedings was granted to the members of the Indian legislature. Besides, the Legislature’s members immunized from any court proceedings were in respect of their “speech or vote” in both the Chambers of the Indian Legislature[6].

Currently, Article 105(1)[7] and Article 194(1)[8] of the Indian Constitution confer the freedom of speech in the House to the Parliament and the State Legislatures respectively. This is actually in addition to the freedom of speech granted to every citizen of India under Article 19(1) (a). Articles 105(2) and 194(2) grant to the Parliament and the State Legislatures respectively, immunity from proceedings in any court in respect of “anything said or any vote given by him or any committee thereof, and no person shall be so liable in respect of the publication of any report, paper, votes or proceedings”. ‘Anything’, in this clause, is referred to be of the widest import and inferred to be the equivalent of ‘everything’[9]. Further, Article 105(3)[10] and Article 194(3) state that the Parliament and State Legislatures shall define their privileges and immunities in other respects by law. However, the Parliament or the State Legislatures have, to date, not enacted any law in pursuance of these Articles to date. Therefore, the powers and privileges of both the Houses of the Parliament and each Legislature continue to be those of the House of Commons of the Parliament of the United Kingdom. Consequently, the Parliament and all State Legislatures are also conferred with the power to punish for breach of its privilege or contempt of the House, which was exercised by the House of Commons of the UK Parliament.


The facts of the Keshav Singh’s case are not controversial but a little long and complicated. The Uttar Pradesh Assembly had passed a resolution on March 14, 1964, that a reprimand be administered to one Keshav Singh, who was a Gorakhpur resident, for having committed contempt of the House and the breach of the privileges of a member of the House named Narsingh Narain Pandey. The contempt of the House and the breach of privileges came to the fore because of pamphlets that were signed, printed and distributed by Keshav Singh, libelling Mr. Pandey, accusing him of bribery and corruption. Although he was repeatedly required to appear before the Assembly, Keshav Singh refused to do so, quoting the inability to pay for the required travel journey to Lucknow. He was later brought to the Assembly in the execution of a warrant issued by the Speaker of the House on March 14, 1964. He refused to take part in the proceedings of the House and thereby disrespected the Assembly. Shortly after the reprimand was administered to him, the Speaker read a letter dated March 11, 1964, which Keshav Singh had written to him, in which he stated that he “protested against the sentence of reprimand and had absolutely no hesitation in calling a corrupt man corrupt”, adding that “the contents of his pamphlet were correct and that a brutal attack had been made on democracy by issuing the warrant on him”. The Assembly, therefore, passed a unanimous resolution and sentenced Keshav Singh to imprisonment for seven days for the deeply disrespectful letter and misbehavior in the floor of the House. A general or unspeaking warrant, which did not cite the facts which constituted contempt, was issued to the Marshal of the House and the Superintendent of Lucknow District Jail to arrest him and he was taken to jail on the same day and kept imprisoned there. On March 19, 1964, six days after his arrest, Keshav Singh’s advocate filed a petition to a bench of Allahabad High Court for issuing a writ of Habeas Corpus to secure the release of his client, stating that he had been deprived of his personal liberty without any authority of law and that this detention was mala fide and with ill-will. The petition was made under Article 226 of the Constitution and section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Court, on the merits of the petition, pronounced a judgment that Keshav Singh is released on bail on a few conditions. This judgment intervened with the imprisonment order passed by the House by permitting Keshav Singh to be released on bail even before he had served his sentence fully. Therefore, on March 21, 1964, the Assembly passed a resolution stating that both the Judges of the Lucknow Bench and his advocate be brought in custody before the House; and Keshav Singh was to be taken into custody and brought before the House after he had served the remainder of his sentence. On the same day, both the Judges filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the Allahabad High Court itself to quash the resolution of the Assembly of March 21, 1964. Warrants were issued on March 23, 1964, to the House Marshal and Lucknow Commissioner for carrying out the orders of the new resolution. This petition was heard by all the Judges of the High Court, except those two Judges. They passed judgment on the same day directing the resolution be stayed. The Assembly later stated that Judges will not be arrested but issued notices to them to appear in the House to justify their actions of delivering judgment against the House. The warrants against the Judges were withdrawn.

Considering the entire case facts and the conflict between the legislature and the judiciary, the President of India constructed five questions for the opinion of the Hon’ble Supreme Court under Article 143(1)[11], which authorizes the President “to refer to Supreme Court questions of law or facts, which appear to him, to have arisen or are likely to arise, and which are of such a nature and of such public importance that it is expedient to obtain the opinion of the Supreme Court”.

The facts clearly indicated that there was a serious conflict between the jurisdiction of the High Court and its Judges and the UP Assembly. The questions referred to the Supreme Court under the Reference were: (a) Whether the Lucknow Bench of the High Court of Uttar Pradesh should have dealt with the petition of Mr. Keshav Singh against the sentence imposed on him by the House (b) Whether Mr. Keshav Singh, his Advocate, and the two Judges committed contempt of the House (c) Whether the House could direct the production of the two Judges and the Advocate before it to seek explanation (d) Whether the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court had the constitutional right to take up the petition of the Judge and pass an order (e) Whether a Judge of a High Court, who passes any order on the contempt orders of the House, commits contempt of the House, and whether the House can initiate proceedings against such a Judge for exercising his constitutional duty.  

The Supreme Court referred to so many cases and precedents across the world in detail and finally came to certain conclusions regarding the answers. (a) The Lucknow Bench was competent to deal with Habeas Corpus petitions. (b) There was no material fact to convince the Court that filing the petition was an illegal act and therefore no contempt was committed by both the Judges and Keshav Singh with regard to the filing of the petition. (c) It was not competent for the House to charge the Judges to be guilty of contempt without giving them a hearing and they were also incompetent to order their custody. (d) The Full Bench of the High Court had the constitutional authority to pass interim orders that it did. (e) Neither does a Judge who entertains the petition of a person against a House’s order commits contempt of the House, nor is the House competent to take actions against the Judge.

The petition for bail was filed in Allahabad High Court after the Supreme Court sent its suggestion to the President through the Reference.


  1. The House does not possess any penal jurisdiction and has no power to penalize any person for its contempt.
  2. Even if the House had such power, the detention of the petitioner is illegal since it is in violation of Article 22(2) of the Constitution.
  3. The conviction of the petitioner by the House violated the provisions of Articles 21 and 22(1) and of the principles of Natural Justice.
  4. The Superintendent, District Jail, Lucknow, had no power to receive and detain the petitioner on the basis of the warrant issued by the House
  5. The actions of the House to punish the petitioner was mala fide and out of political ill-will.


  1. The House possesses penal jurisdiction under Article 194(3) and since it is also a court of record, it could penalize persons for its contempt.
    1. Provisions of Part III of the Constitution are not relevant to a case falling under Article 194(3) of the Constitution; the former always yield to the later.
    1. Stripping of the personal liberty and freedom of the petitioner is according to the procedure laid down and established by law.
    1. There is no express prohibition against the Superintendent of a Jail receiving persons sent by a competent authority other than a Court of law and therefore Superintendent of that jail was bound by law to receive the petitioner and to detain him in accordance with the warrant issued by the Speaker.
    1. The mere fact that the person committed for contempt belongs to some other political party other than the majority party in the House is no indication of the fact that the House acted mala fide.


The authority of the House to penalize persons for its contempt was described as one of the cornerstones of parliamentary privileges[12] in the United States of America, since, as has been held in the Indian case of Raj Narain Singh v. Atmaram Gobind Kher[13], it would not be able to protect and preserve its authority and discharge the duties and responsibilities endowed on it properly if it had no power to punish offenders for the breach of its privileges. In addition, the Supreme Court of India in several cases such as Pandit MSM Sharma v. Sri Krishna Sinha[14], and Homi D. Mistry v. Nafisul Hassan[15], held that Courts of law cannot scrutinize the power of the House to punish citizens for its contempt since it is a constitutionally vested power. In the case of Gunupati Keshavram Reddy v. Nafisul Hasan and the State of U.P[16] one, Gunupati Keshavram was charged and arrested for contempt of legislative assembly, Uttar Pradesh on the order of the speaker of the House. He was not produced before a magistrate, violating Article 22(2). The apex court held that fundamental rights have been infringed by the said order of speaker of the House thereby struck down the same. This Judgement demonstrates that the privileges of the members of House and the ambit of power for punishing contempt are subject to Part III of the Indian Constitution. Thus the exercised power cannot infringe the fundamental rights of Article 19 of 21[17]. However, the majority judgment, in that case, observed that it proceeded on the case entirely on a concession of counsel and said that it cannot be regarded as a considered opinion on the subject. So, this part of the judgment cannot strictly be justified. In A.M. Paulraj v. Speaker, Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly[18], the petitioner was penalized by the next assembly for the contempt of the previous assembly. The new assembly increased the punishment to two weeks of simple imprisonment from the initial punishment of only one week of simple Imprisonment by the previous assembly. One A.M. Paulraj submitted that his fundamental right under Article 21 had been infringed.  The court decided following the procedure in the UK, a New House of Commons had the power to punish a person for contempt of the earlier House of Commons; the same could be done in India too. However, the Court refused to comment on the increase in the period of imprisonment of the petitioner which was grossly arbitrary. In the case of Balasubramanium v. State of Tamil Nadu[19], the Speaker punished a magazine’s editor to 3 months’ rigorous imprisonment for contempt of the House. However, public opinion dominated the news and the Chief Minister was forced to interfere and take a decision. Eventually, the Court awarded an unsubstantiated repayment to the petitioner.


Article 194(3) describes that the State Legislature derives its powers, privileges, and immunities from the House of Commons in England. This makes Keshav Singh’s case a little bit more complicated. In England, there were several controversies and animosities in the past between the House of Commons of the UK and the courts of law on this question. Conflicts came up because the parliamentary privileges which were mostly unmodified were based on the non-statutory, undefined, common law. After the case of Jay v. Tolpham[20], the House of Commons called two judges of the King’s Bench to its bar to explain their conduct, and later these judges were ordered to be imprisoned. The judges were ordered to appear because seven years earlier, they had ordered Jay to be released from the custody of the Sergeant at arms of the House. In the case of Sheriff of Middlesex[21], the House of Commons confined the sheriff into custody and the warrant did not mention the facts, i.e., it was a general warrant. The court didn’t issue habeas corpus writ to release the Sheriff stating that if the warrant merely states contempt in general terms, the court is bound by it and cannot proceed to take any further action on the same. Another case of parliamentary power to decide contempt cases occurred in Australia in 1955. The proprietor, an editor of the ‘Banstown Observer’ was imprisoned for a privileged breach of the Australian House of Representatives. The High Court of Australia refused to issue the writ of habeas corpus stating that it had no jurisdiction and was not entitled to look behind the warrant which was conclusive of what was stated that privilege had been breached. The Privy Council in Queen v. Richards[22]characterized the High Court decision as “unimpeachable”. The House of Commons has the constitutional right and authority to commit any person for contempt and if it issues a general warrant – which does not state the grounds on which it regards its contempt having been committed – the courts would not be able to do anything about the matter. The House of Commons thus has an absolute power to commit a person for its contempt, since the facts of the alleged contempt need not be stated by it on its warrant of committal and the courts would not go behind the same[23].


The theory of Lex Parliament was put forward in the case of Stockdale v. Hansard[24](1839) and it was shattered by the judgment of that case. It was declared in this case that under the Constitution, the House of Commons could no longer bring forward any law by a mere resolution and that resolution passed will not and cannot act as a judgment of a court of law. The theory of Lex Parliament consisted of a separate system of law or a completely new jurisprudence and rules with which the Judiciary had no concern. The answers given by the Supreme Court of India to the questions sent to it by the President clearly depicts the difficulties which were the unavoidable results of trying to fit the ever-changing British contents of unwritten Constitutional Law of the powers, privileges, and immunities of the House of Commons into a rigid federal structure of our written Constitution. The SC, in its Reference Order, held that the attitudes or conventions or understandings or comity between the House of Commons and courts in England, which are not in the legally enforceable realm or established rules at all, therefore, it cannot be inserted on the body of our written Constitution by mere convention or understanding.


In India, when Legislature exercises a judicial or quasi-judicial function in penalizing persons for its contempt, the duty of finding out whether the said Legislature has overstepped the limits of its legal authority is vested with the judiciary. The Judiciary must perform its duty when there is an infringement of the fundamental rights of a citizen. Since India has does not have any defined law, even today, which decides the scope of the powers and privileges of the Legislature, adjudication by courts is the only option left whenever there is a dispute between the House’s contempt decisions and infringement of fundamental rights. Every wing of State has the right of fixing the limits of its own powers and jurisdiction so that it does not exceed legal authority in exercising it. However, when a citizen complaints of an excess of power or misuse of power or abuse of power on the part of any authority or organ of State, then, according to principles of justice, the alleged authority could not be made the Judge, or, the sole and exclusive judge of his/her own cause in a case in which the citizen’s complaint is against that authority itself. If there arises a situation where decisions of authority could not be questioned at all anywhere, even if the decisions are grossly and arbitrarily beyond the reasonable scope of its powers, it would be an open invitation for that authority to exceed its powers. Therefore, it is not only competent for the Courts of law to decide on cases relating to disputes but also absolutely their duty and responsibility to do so, according to the Constitution.


The specific issue with respect to the dispute between Speaker’s power to punish for the contempt of House and the press’s freedom granted under Article 19(1) (a) came for adjudication by the Apex Court in M.S.M. Sharma v. Shri Krishna Sinha [25]. In the subject matter, the editor of searchlight an English daily was charged for publishing parts of the speech expunged by the speaker of the Legislative Assembly of Bihar thereby amounting to contempt of House. The editor appealed to the Apex Court on grounds that punishing him for contempt amounted to the infringement of his fundamental rights under Articles 19(1) (a) and 21. It was at this juncture that the Court considered how Article 19(1) (a) and 21 were to be read with Article 194(3).

Firstly, the Indian legislature has the powers to prohibit the publication of its debates, deriving the power from the House of Commons on 26.01.1950. Secondly, Article 194 is not within the clutches of Article 19. Moreover, Article 19 is a general provision unlike article 194 which is a special provision. As a general provision cannot override a special provision Article 194 will have an overriding effect over Article 19.If at all a conflict arises harmonious construction must be applied to resolve the same. Thirdly, Infringement of personal liberty by a procedure established and in accordance by law is valid, hence Article 21 is not violated.


The Supreme Court used the doctrine of harmonious construction to arrive at a judgment in Sharma’s case. The Judges in the case held that the principle of harmonious construction has to be applied for reconciling the two articles, i.e., Article 194(3) and Article 19(1) (a); Since Article 194(3) is a special provision, it must always take precedence over the fundamental rights guaranteed in Article 19(1) (a) which is a general provision. However, as regards the above judgment, in Special Reference No. 1 of 1964 17, the SC’s Reference to the President on the Keshav Singh’s case, it was decided by SC that Article 194(3) is always subordinate to Articles 21, 32, 211 and 226 of the Indian Constitution. According to the rule of harmonious construction, a statute should be read as a whole, and one provision of the Act should be construed with reference to other provisions in the same Act so as to make ratification of the whole statute. Interpretations between different provisions of the same Act would be helpful in avoiding inconsistency and confusion either within a section or between a section and other parts of the statute.


The cornerstone of the Supreme Court’s standpoint is the advocacy of the harmonious and coordinated functioning of the three parts of the democratic state, viz., legislature, executive, and the judiciary. The Court emphasized that these three organs must function rationally and harmoniously. Article 211[26] of the Constitution disentitles the State Legislature any power to discuss the conduct and proceedings of a High Court judge; thereby the House has no authority to take measures against a High Court judge when he performs his duties and obligations. The Apex Court further held that the citizen’s right to go to the courts of law and the advocate’s right to accommodate that operation must remain unconstrained by the Articles 105(3) or 194(3). The SC said that the House of Commons could perpetuate a person for contempt only by a non-justifiable general warrant because it was not only acting as a legislature but also performing the functions as a superior court of record. Parliament and the State Legislatures in India have never been a court of records, therefore, they can never claim such a privilege because of the existence of the Fundamental Rights and the doctrine of judicial review; particularly Articles 32 and 226, which not only empower the Supreme Court and High Courts but impose a duty on it to enforce Fundamental Rights. Thus, a court can examine an unspeaking warrant of the House because an order punishing a person for its contempt is not an incontrovertible one. The SC, through the Reference to the President, not only tried to maintain judicial integrity and independence; for if a House were to claim a right to question the conduct of a judge, then judicial independence would be seriously compromised but also sought to acknowledge the fact that the House has the power to commit for its contempt or breach of its privilege. Currently, the Committee of Privileges conducts an inquiry and gives the petitioner a chance to defend himself before it decides the matter.


After the Supreme Court’s opinion to the President, the Allahabad High Court, going through the facts and circumstances of the petition, still dismissed it and did not interfere with the judgment of the House. Although the petitioner contended that the facts found by the Assembly did not amount to contempt of the Assembly, the High Court turned it down. The HC also dictated that there was neither a violation of Article 21 nor of natural justice by the respondent since the legislature had framed rules to investigate and also had a constitutional right to punish for contempt. The HC also stated that the Superintendent of the District jail was well within his jurisdictional limits to execute the warrant received from the Speaker. The HC said that provisions of Part III of the Constitution are not relevant to a case falling under Article 194(3) of the Constitution and reiterated that the fundamental rights in Part III yield to Article 194(3). The HC also ruled that the deprivation of the personal liberty of the petitioner is according to the procedure laid down and established by law under the latter part of Article 194(3). The petitioner had also argued that his commitment by the Assembly was mala fide as the Assembly was dominated by political ill-will and hatred.  The charge of mala fides against the House could not be substantiated just because the person charged belonged to a political party different from the majority party in the House. The HC disposed Keshav Singh’s case and denied inferring mala fides in the Assembly. The High Court held, dismissing Keshav Singh’s petition, that whether there had been contempt of the House, or not, in a situation, is a matter exclusively and solely for the House to decide and that the court would not go into the question of legality.


Article 194 of the Constitution was amended in the 44th amendment in 1978. The amendment resulted in changing the clause (3) of the said Article with the words “shall be those of that House and of its members and committees immediately before the coming into force of section 26 of the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978”, the words, figures, and brackets instead of the words “shall be those of the House of Commons of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, and of its members and committees, at the commencement of this Constitution”. The effect of the amendment is of no change since, although the reference of the House of Commons is removed from the article, the power and privileges guaranteed by the said article are still tied with the British system.

In Dr. Rajendra Prasad’s view about the powers and privileges, “Parliament may never legislate on that point and it is therefore for the members to be vigilant.”[27] Would be a fitting conclusion of the paper.



  • The Constitution of India 1950.
  • The Government of India act,1935.


  • Tej Kiran Jain v. N. Sanjiva Reddy A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1573
  • Raj Narain Singh v. Atmaram Gobind Kher, AIR 1954, All 319
  • Pandit MSM Sharma v. Sri Krishna Sinha AIR 1959 SC 395
  • Homi D. Mistry v. Nafisul Hassan ILR 1957 Bombay 218
  • Gunupati Keshavram Reddy v. Nafisul Hasan and the State of U.P  AIR 1954 SC 636
  • A.M. Paulraj v. Speaker, Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly AIR 1986 Mad 248
  • In The Matter Of: Under Article 143 … vs Unknown on 30 September, 1964 Equivalent citations: AIR 1965 SC 745
  • Balasubramanium v. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 1995 Mad 329.
  • Jay v. Topham, 12St. Tr. 821
  • Sheriff of Middlesex [1840] 11 Ad. & E. 273
  • Queen v. Richards 92 C.L.R. 157, 164, 171
  • Stockdale v. Hansard 9 Ad. & E. I : Supra 104


  • Subhash C. Kashyap, PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGES IN INDIA, 1554 (2000)
  • CUSHING, L., Elements of The Law And Practice Of Legislative Assemblies In The United States Of America, 1874
  • Jain, M.  Indian Constitutional Law. 2003.

[1] Student, first year, BA LLB (Hons.), School of Excellence in Law, The Tamil Nadu Dr. Ambedkar Law University, Chennai.

[2] Student, first year, BA LLB (Hons.), School of Excellence in Law, The Tamil Nadu Dr. Ambedkar Law University, Chennai.

[3] INDIA CONST. art. 194, cl. 3.

[4] Keshav Singh v. Speaker, Legislative Assembly, AIR 1965 All 349.


[6] Section 28 clause (1), THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT, 1935

[7] INDIA CONST. art. 105, cl. 1.

[8] INDIA CONST. art. 194, cl. 1.

[9] Tej Kiran Jain v. N. Sanjiva Reddy, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1573.

[10] INDIA CONST. art. 105, cl. 3.

[11] INDIA CONST. art. 143, cl. 1.

[12] CUSHING, L., Elements of The Law And Practice Of Legislative Assemblies In The United States Of America. 1874; Jain, M.  Indian Constitutional Law. 2003 5th ed.

[13] Raj Narain Singh v. Atmaram Gobind Kher, AIR 1954, All 319.

[14] Pandit MSM Sharma v. Sri Krishna Sinha, AIR 1959 SC 395.

[15] Homi D. Mistry v. Nafisul Hassan, ILR 1957 Bombay 218.

[16] Gunupati Keshavram Reddy v. Nafisul Hasan and the State of U.P, AIR 1954 SC 636.

[17] INDIA CONST. art. 19: INDIA CONST. art. 21.

[18] A.M. Paulraj v. Speaker, Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, AIR 1986 Mad 248.

[19] Balasubramanium v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1995 Mad 329.

[20] Jay v. Topham, 12St. Tr. 821

[21]Sheriff of Middlesex, (1840) 11 Ad. & E. 273

[22] Queen v. Richards, 92 C.L.R. 157, 164, 171

[23] MAY, op. cit, 200; Select Comm. Report, 95 (1967).

[24] Stockdale v. Hansard, 9 Ad. & E. I : Supra 104.

[25] M.S.M. Sharma v. Shri Krishna Sinha A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 395.

[26] INDIA CONST. art. 211.

[27] M R Madhavan, Questions of privilege, PRS Legislative Research, ( june 27, 2020, 08:43 PM),,Commons%20as%20a%20temporary%20measure.&text=Of%20course%2C%20Parliament%20may%20never,enacted%20any%20law%20till%20date.

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